Opening a specially crafted GitHub issue could have injected commands into a Snowflake build workflow, Wiz researchers disclosed.
The vulnerable workflow, jira_issue.yml, ran whenever a public issue was opened and inserted attacker-controlled title and body values directly into a shell run block that contained internal Jira credentials. A logic bug made it worse: the workflow checked a pull request property that does not exist for issue events, so the login comparison evaluated to an empty string and never blocked execution.
Wiz’s Red Agent system hit the injection during authorized testing. After its opening payload tripped a shell syntax error, the agent shifted approach and got through. The leaked credential, tied to qa@snowflake.net, had read access to Jira projects for engineering, security compliance, and bug bounty tracking.
Wiz reported the issue through HackerOne on June 23, 2026, and Snowflake merged a fix the same day, rotating the token on June 24. Snowflake said its investigation found no evidence of unauthorized access. The workflow had reached the default branch only five days earlier, on June 18.
No CVE has been assigned. The incident illustrates how unvalidated issue data can turn CI pipelines into attack surface, and why repositories should treat all untrusted event payloads as hostile input.
